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The potential impact of Blockchains on Corporate governance: 
A survey on shareholders’ rights in the Digital era 
 
Véronique MAGNIER & Patrick BARBAN 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Soon, BC technology may offer a significant alternative to classical ownership ledgers, an 
important topic which is worth dealing with on a legal perspective. In the last years, the 
Blockchain technology has grown in reputation, trending in the press and on social media. As 
a result, more and more companies rely on that technology in order to provide new products 
and services. The Fintech industry illustrates the use of the Blockchain technology to provide 
enhanced payment, banking and financial services1. To facilitate the implementation of these 
new services, some actors require changes in regulation. Some even argue that the rise of the 
Blockchain is likely to put an end to the need of any legal system, quoting Lawrence Lessig 
without fully understanding him2, under the famous “Code is Law”3 and its derivative, Lex 
Cryptographica4. No more judges and no more central authorities needed under a transparent, 
secured and autonomous organization5. Conversely, voices are rising to claim that the 
                                                          
 Véronique Magnier is full-time Professor of law at Paris-Sud/Paris-Saclay University, Director of Insitute Droit 
Ethique Patrimoine, veronique.magnier@u-psud.fr; Patrick Barban is full-time Professor of law at Le Havre – 
Normandie University, patrick.barban@univ-lehavre.fr.  
1 For instance, the Depositary Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTTC), the leading company in Post-trade services 
has announced the launch of a Credit Default Swap register based on distributed Ledger Technology. 
2 As Lessig explains in his paper that the architecture of the code is able to reflect the value – or the absence of 
value – of a society, protecting or denying protection for privacy or other fundamental rights. 
3 [https://harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html], accessed on 28/08/2018. 
4 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 32, p. 49 and p. 193 : Lex Cryptographica is the idea that the best regulator in a 
technological infrastructure is the code of that infrastructure itself. The use of the technology can be shaped in 
order to forbid technically unwanted use of the technology (as illegal music downloading), thus lowering the need 
of human regulation. 
5 De Fillippi P., Wright A., Ibid., p. 194 : the authors express the idea that “Technical rules could increasingly 
assume the same role and functionality as legal rules”. The authors advocate the use of technology to achieve more 
predictable rules as opposed to law written in natural language. But these advantages must be carefully balanced. 
First, the implementation of the rules into the code would forbid a user to commit a breach of the law. the virtue 
of perfect predictability is minored by the fact that no adjustment can be made in order to ensure the rights of the 
user to its particular situation. Second and more importantly, such a system is dangerous in regards to the respect 
of fundamental rights. A free state is based on a liberty principle where the citizens are free to act but would suffer 
the punishment for a breach of law. Liberty means fundamentally an ex-post control system, not an ex-ante system 
where liberty would be immediately hampered by the code. 
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Blockchain is only a trend in social media and should soon vanish, as is the fate of many other 
trends before. 
 
On a more moderate tone, we think on the contrary that the Blockchain is a new and promising 
technology that will only slightly alter corporate law. It is not, however, a new paradigm.  On 
the one hand, the technology increases efficiency in exchanges and group organization, 
especially in the organization of corporations. On the other hand, it could be detrimental to 
certain aspects of the Law and could facilitate fraud and money laundering. As many 
technologies before, especially the Internet, blockchain will bring forth legal changes only if its 
use is deemed beneficial. 
 
But what is a Blockchain? Blockchain technology has been implemented by a person or group 
called “Satoshi Nakamoto”, alongside with a paper explaining the technical aspects of the 
technology and its purpose: “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”6. The main 
purpose of the Bitcoin is to settle a global database permitting the exchange of a new digital 
currency called “the Bitcoin”. The decentralized characteristic of the technology should bring 
an end to the need for a Third-Party such as a central bank7. A decade later, a new system called 
Ethereum was born with new functionalities such as a better use of Tokens and the 
implementation of “Smart Contract” enabling the coding of a growing number of applications8. 
Rather than a new technology, it is the improvement of the former as it will be itself the root of 
further improvements. 
 
The Blockchain system works as a Peer-to-Peer system, a system where all participants act as 
a supplier and consumer of information, as opposed to a server-based system where a central 
server furnishes the information to all clients. The system by itself possesses a certain number 
of characteristics, in order to establish an autonomous system, which does not rely on a central 
authority. The Blockchain needs to combine both a high level of security based on cryptography 
and the absence of third-party acting as central authority9. To settle an efficient and autonomous 
                                                          
6 [https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf], accessed on 28/08/2018. 
7 The Bitcoin was a response to the financial crisis of 2008 resulting in a trust-crisis toward central authorities and 
the banking system. 
8 [https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper], accessed on 28/08/2018. 
9 Before the Bitcoin they were digital currencies. But to avoid the issue of double spending, they relied on a central 
authority. As a matter of fact, a digital currency is merely a sum of bits. An actor who own 5 of them can send 5 
to a friend and 5 to another friend. No one is able to know that this actor has effectively spend its 5 coins. Therefore, 
he was able to send 10 coins. He has committed a fraud, spending more coins that he owns and created inflation. 
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system, the Blockchain relies on nodes: basically, computing power used to create hash codes 
to link each new block to the chain. This activity is called “mining” as it allows the owners of 
the nodes to collect bitcoins or other tokens10. It is not the purpose of this paper to explain how 
the system functions since it has already been explained11. Nevertheless, the fundamental 
purpose of a Blockchain must be summarized to confront them to Corporate Law and Corporate 
Governance.  
 
Basically, a Blockchain is a Public Register (1) that can both offer a way to exchange assets (2) 
and establish complex organizations and governance systems (3). 
 
1. Public Register: by itself, the Blockchain is a Public Register. The Public feature of the 
Blockchain is required to achieve transparency. As there is no third party or central authority 
overseeing the system, the public itself must be able to access all the transactions occurring on 
a blockchain, either to use them (as nodes do) or to supervise them. Each Blockchain can 
therefore be downloaded by all users, containing all the past transactions since its creation. The 
Register can also allow access to more complex information such as music or pdf files, medical 
information12, etc. However, the fundamental feature of this function is the inalterability of the 
register, which participates in its security. In order to manipulate the register, it would be 
necessary to change all the past history of the register on a global scale: each and every version 
of the blockchain on all existing and active nodes would have to be similarly impaired. Such a 
manipulation would need an overwhelming computing power to “mine” new blocks in a more 
efficient and incentive way 13. At last, the inalterability of the blockchain can allow the 
dissemination of authenticated information such a personal data or bank account information14. 
 
                                                          
It is the basic issue of forged money. Hence the need of a central authority to whom all the transactions will be 
send for regulation. 
10 Each transaction is put in a block which is chained to the previous block. That block use the hash code of the 
previous one (acting as a timestamp) and will get its own hash code based on the transactions that are coded inside. 
To code it, several node proceeds by creating the hash with a Proof-of-Work system. The first node that manage 
to find a solution send it to all the other nodes. The new block is chained to the others and a new version of the 
blockchain is downloaded by all the other nodes. Tokens and transactions fees are transferred to the node who first 
found the solution as an incentive. 
11 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 13-32. 
12 For instance MedRec: [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7573685/], accessed on 28/08/2018. 
13 Therefore, one who would possess such a computing power will earn more by using the power to the benefit of 
the system rather than to its detriment. 
14 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 18. 
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2. Exchange Function: The second function of a Blockchain is to allow the exchange of assets. 
From a rather simple asset such as the Bitcoin to more developed one allowed by Ethereum, 
Blockchains allow a secured way to exchange resources. Blockchain allows also the use of 
tokens – called Ether for Ethereum – which represent a right to a given service or the use of a 
prerogative such as a vote in a general meeting or the right to receive dividends. The exchange 
Function can be more sophisticated with the use of smart contracts, which allow automatization 
of exchanges. Using a single rule of “If… then…”, a smart contract is a program functioning 
on the basis of Tokens. If a specific condition is fulfilled, the program will proceed by sending 
or blocking the use of an amount of Token or money. Such smart contracts can be linked 
together to build complex organization, where validation by the first is needed in order to use 
the second (and then third, and so on…). Such exchanges lower transaction costs as no 
intermediaries are needed, execution of contracts is instantaneous. Moreover, markets 
functioning on blockchain would access full efficiency as demonstrated by Fama15, given that 
certified information is accessible on real-time and without cost. As information and trading 
cost are equal to 0 on such a market, the price of the tokens will reflect perfect economical value 
of the underlying assets. 
 
3. Organization and Consensus Facilitation: The global use of smart contracts leads to 
completely automatized and decentralized organization. The use of blockchain can facilitate the 
coordination of a social activity. A social institution is based on a collective idea put in motion 
by a given governance and a decision system16. Some companies allow the automatization of 
governance systems such as the French Republic Constitution17. In theory, a business 
corporation could be organized solely on blockchain. The system would allow shareholders to 
register their titles in the blockchain and cast votes during purely virtual general meetings. 
 
As previously described, a blockchain needs not a third-party to operate. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to restrain a blockchain by allowing a central authority to oversee it. Such a blockchain 
will lose its public and autonomous functions as the central authority will be able to supervise 
the transaction by itself, to unilaterally alter how the code functions and limit access to the 
                                                          
15 Fama E., Efficient Capital Market: A review of Theory and Empirical work, The Journal of Finance, 25(2), 
1970, p. 383; Fama E., Efficient Capital Markets: II, The Journal of Finance, 46(5), 1991, 
[https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04636.x], p. 1575. 
16 To summarize the idea behind Maurice Hauriou institution: Millard E., Hauriou et la théorie de l’institution, 
Droit et société, 30-31, 1995, p. 381. 
17 [http://klsn.io], accessed on 28/08/2018. 
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blockchain18. Such “private” blockchain are referred under the term of “permissioned 
blockchain”19. Notwithstanding the loss of the philosophy behind the bitcoin in such a system, 
it remains a blockchain. 
 
What is the potential impact on corporate law and corporate governance? The rights 
traditionally granted to shareholders by law are principally exercised at the annual general 
meeting. These rights are twofold and comprise voting rights on one part, and financial rights 
on another. Closely connected to these two sets of rights, the information rights are also granted 
by law in order to make votes and financial rights more efficient, with legal intent prevailing 
over black-letter law.20 Beyond legal aspects, these rights are a strong element of corporate 
governance too, mainly the mainstream version of it, the ‘shareholder primacy model’.21 This 
corporate governance model, focusing on the primacy of shareholders, seeks to maximize 
shareholder wealth and consequently avoid the existence of informational asymetries between 
managers and shareholders. Emerging in the specific economic context of the ‘modern 
corporation’ fathered by Berle and Means22, it refers to large-scale manufacturing corporations 
in the wake of the second industrial revolution. It points out the lack of control on managers 
and potential conflicts of interests, occurring when managers act in their own self-interest -
allocating high remuneration packages to themselves for example-, and extract benefits from 
the company. 23 First developed in the United States, this theory later spread all over the world 
where a growing need for capital to build large infrastructure projects existed.24 Although this 
mainstream version of corporate governance model was challenged by other models25, pursuant 
to the Dodd doctrine26, it became the ‘dominant ideology’27 in practice.   
                                                          
18 As it is the case for DTCC, for instance. 
19 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 31. 
20 Germain, M. and V. Magnier, Ripert et Roblot, n°°2777 s. 
21 Magnier V.: Comparative corporate governance. Legal Perspectives, Elgar ed., 2017, p. 15. 
22 Berle A.A. and G. Means: The Modern corporation and Private Property, New York, Harcourt, revised ed. 
1968. 
23 Jensen M.C.; Mekcling, W.H., Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3, p. 305. 
24 Dignam, A. and M. Galanis: The Globalization of Corporate Governance, Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2009; 
Gomez, P.-Y. and H. Korin: Entrepreneurs and Democracy: A Political Theory of Corporate Governance, London 
Business School, 2011.  
25 Blair M.M; Stout, L.A: A team production theory of corporate law, Virginia Law Review, 1999, 2 (85), p.238; 
Blair, M.M: Shareholder value, corporate governance, and corporate performance: a post-Enron reassessment of 
the conventional wisdom, in Cornelius P;K. Kogut B. eds: Corporate governance and capital flows in a global 
economy, Global outlook Book series, Oxford University press, 2003, p.53; Millon in Vasudev, P.M; Watson, S,: 
Corporate governance after the financial crisis, Edward Elgar, 2012. 
26 Dood E., For whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, Harvard Law Review, 45, 1932, p.1145.  
27 Hansmann H. and R. Kraakman: The End of History for Corporate Law, Georgetown Law Journal, 89, 2001, p. 
439. 
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The right to vote and its corollary, the right to information, are a major concern to legal policy 
makers, be it hard of soft law. At the international level, the OECD Corporate governance 
Principles are a noticeable first attempt at establishing a universal set of principles for 
companies operating worldwide, with respect to sustainable economic growth. 28 Whereas the 
OECD broadly defines corporate governance as ‘a set of relationships between company’s 
management, its board, its shareholder and its stakeholders’, the principles focus on classical 
governance issues resulting from the separation of ownership and control. They mainly promote 
common rights and an equitable treatment for shareholders, with respect to shareholders access 
to information, to cross-border voting rights and the importance of fair and effective price 
discovery in stock markets. Following the same path, the EU institutions have issued the 
Shareholder Rights Directive 2007/3629 revised in 2017.30 These texts have sought to facilitate 
the effective exercise of rights for shareholders in a globalized world. The Directive (EU) 
2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement goes further 
so as to fill certain governance gaps in relation to the behavior of companies and their advisors, 
shareholders, proxies and proxy voting agencies. Member States have to comply with it by 10 
June 2019.31 
 
How BC may impact corporate law and corporate governance? Whereas this question is 
precisely the focus of this paper, it first advocates for a quick overview of the literature 
considering the general impact of blockchains on law and the various ways in which the two 
interact. 
 
Blockhain technology is a typical record-keeping mechanism32 and as such may be considered 
as a ‘21st century version of the recording systems that have been around since people started 
                                                          
28 OECD Principles of corporate governance, 2014 version, [www.oecd.org/corporate/2014-review-oecd-
corporate-governance-principles.html. 
29 Magnier V. : Nouvelles mesures en faveur de la démocratie actionnariale dans les sociétés cotées, Revue des 
sociétés, 2011, n°5, p.267. 
302017/828 revised Directive on shareholders rights [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L0828&from=EN] 
31 Barban P. : L’identification des actionnaires, Revue des sociétés, 12, 2017, p. 678; adde Germain M. et alii : 
Corporate governance in listed companies, Fondation nationale pour le droit continental, Semaine juridique, 
Entreprise et affaires ed,, 47, nov. 2013, 1639, p.22. 
32 Among good other references, refer to chapter one entitled ‘Blockchain technology basics’ in Casey M. et alii 
eds : The Impact of Blockchain Technology on Finance: A Catalyst for change, Geneva Report on the World 
Economy, ICBM and CEPR, 21, 2018.  
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chiselling marks on cave walls’.33 In parallel, it is strongly argued that blockchains offer a 
revolutionary application of cryptography and information technology.34 The key question is 
the following: would this new technology impact law so as to transform law in such a way that 
it could be embedded in code? A big debate started on this subject a few years ago. On the one 
hand, most authors agree upon the absence of ‘neutrality’ of the blockchain technology. It is 
more generally the technological artifacts that are said to be not neutral. At least, two 
dimensions should be accoutered for justifying this non-neutrality.35 First, technology design is 
not neutral: 36 whatever the presence of any intention behind a technological artifact, its design 
ends up imposing some types of actions or, on the opposite, preventing or even forbidding 
others.37 Second, they are politically-oriented. Put another way, the adoption of a specific 
technology, among others, reveals and influence the social and historical context in which this 
technology operates.38 Consequently, not only the choice of a blockchain regime would 
influence law, due to its particular design, but also the way it would be adopted would have 
great social and political (and legal) implications. In other words, like any other technological 
artifacts, blockchain is not neutral but ‘inherently political’.39 On the other hand, authors go 
even further and have recently came up to argue that ‘code is law’. This quote is referring to 
the idea that due to the highly performant codification process permitted by blockchains, code 
seems to be an extremely performant way to complete and even replace regulation.40 The last 
state of thoughts describes how law and code so interact that the blockchain is progressively 
meant to acquire ‘the status of a regulatory technology’, i.e. ‘a technology that can be used both 
to define and incorporate legal provisions into code, and to enforce them.’41 Ultimately, such a 
system would happen ‘irrespectively of whether or not there subsists an underlying legal rule’.42 
The authors do not say how this is feasible nor desirable.43 Regardless of the fact that policy 
makers would not agree to abandon part of their authority to code, and judge would be still be 
                                                          
33 Cecchetti C et alii : Finance and blockchain, [online ref] accessed on 08/28/2018  
34 Among good other references see De Filippi P. ; Hassan, S. : Blockchain technology as a Regulatory 
Technology : from code is law to law is code, unpublished paper [ssrn ref]  
35 De Filippi P.; Hassan S. : see ref. note 34.  
36 Winner, L.: Do artifacts have politics?, Daedelus, 1980, p. 121. 
37 See examples in Smith, N.: The new urban frontier: gentrification and the revanchist city, Psychology press, 
1996 ; Winner 1980 (see ref. note 36). 
38 Jeorges, B.: Do politics have artifacts?, Social studies of science, 29, 1999, p. 411. 
39 Mowshowitz, A.: Computers and the myth of neutrality, Proceedings on the ACM 12th annual computer science 
conference on SIGCSE symposium, 1984, p. 85. 
40 De Filippi, P.; Hassan, S. (see ref. note 34). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 For further discussion, see Yeung, K.: Regulation by Blockchain: The Emerging Battle for Supremacy between 
the Code of Law and Code as Law (July 2, 2018). Modern Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206546 
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needed to interpret general or ambiguous rules, costs of this process should be evaluate first. At 
least, costs of the proof of work needed to update the blockchain, like computer hardware and 
electricity, should be accounted for first.  We doubt this could be achieved in a near future. 
Therefore, we adopt a more realistic and balanced view of the interaction between law and 
blockchains in the remainder of the paper. 
 
Returning to the question at hand, in thinking about the challenge of impacting corporate law 
and corporate governance, it is useful to consider the different ways by which a blockchain 
regime might impair shareholders rights and managers behavior like they are currently defended 
by corporate law and developed by corporate governance recommendations.   
 
The thesis defended in the article: on the one hand, we agree that BC technology is not neutral 
for corporate law and may have beneficial implications on corporate governance practice. On 
the other hand, we consider that ‘Code is law’ is not the right answer to BC techonology regime 
adapted to corporate law and governance. This situation would be very risky on a legal 
perspective in the sense that it could challenge the very existence of underlying corporate law 
rules and impair good governance practice. This is not conceivable right now and we have little 
idea whether or when this would happen. Consequently, we defend a more balanced position: 
BC may favor a more democratic regime in a way that it may significantly facilitate procedural 
mechanism and, as such, upend the balance of power among managers and shareholders. These 
changes are to occur mainly in large corporations and may partly favor their best interest. 
However, we identify some risks that may be detrimental to shareholders’ rights and impact the 
company as a whole. These risks seem significant as they are more qualitative than procedural: 
corporate governance practice could qualitatively suffer for BC, even though these risks are 
difficult to fully assess so far. The EU institutions have not taken these risks into consideration, 
despite they had the opportunity when revising the so-called Shareholders’ Directive.  
 
We argue that these novel risks associated with a BC technology use by large companies should 
be accoutered for by policy makers. The remainder of the essay is organized as follows: section 
2 provides a description of the impacts of BC use by companies, questioning the potential 
emergence of a more direct shareholder democracy; section 3 presents the improved 
management tools; section 4 identifies potential risks associated with corporate governance of 
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companies under BC regime; section 5 concludes the paper summing up arguments for coming 
up legal reforms at the EU level.44 
 
2. THE POTENTIAL EMERGENCE OF A MORE DIRECT SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY? 
2.1. Open access to real-time information 
 
The register function of a blockchain offers a way to facilitate the flow of information from the 
company and toward it. As recording simple to complex information is at the center of the 
blockchain, it offers a costless and efficient way to build a central database. The information 
stored in such a system will profit two kinds of data. First, the company-related information – 
which is often required by law and the focus of corporate governance – could be transmitted 
and stored into a blockchain (2.1.1.). Second, the organization of the shareholding structure 
could also profit the company itself, as it would be simpler for it to collect data about 
shareholders, hence improving knowledge of its capital structure and communication to the 
shareholders and stakeholders (2.1.2.). 
 
2.1.1. Company related information 
 
Corporate law favors information rights toward shareholders, as premises toward the good use 
of their political and financial rights45. Moreover, principles of corporate governance advocate 
transparency toward shareholders in order to create a true shareholder democracy. This focus 
on information is patent under the Action plan for European company law and corporate 
governance: “Enhancing transparency – companies need to provide better information about 
their corporate governance to their investors and society at large. At the same time companies 
should be allowed to know who their shareholders are and institutional investors should be 
more transparent about their voting policies so that a more fruitful dialogue on corporate 
                                                          
44 NB: BC and company law and corporate governance might be studied in 2 aspects: (1) Governance under BC 
technology regime: how BC may affect Corporate law and corporate governance (i.e. can it upend the balance of 
power in companies?); (2) Governance of BC: Issues related to the internal governance of BC, an important topic 
in the way that the organisation of stock exchanges and other capital markets institutions is important today. This 
second series of issues will not be tackled with in the current presentation. Whereas the second point would be 
interesting to develop, the focus of this paper is on the first issue 
45 See Supra 1. 
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governance matters can take place.”46 Some of the changes advocated has been settled as rules 
in the so-called directive for Shareholders” rights47. Legal requirement imposes the use of a 
central register, as in France the “Registre du commerce et des sociétés” in which key 
information about every company with legal capacity is accessible to the public (such as 
corporate name, business name, registered office, etc.). Major events in the life of a company 
are also registered, as change of representative in the company, opening of an insolvency 
procedure or its liquidation. 
Moreover, it is the duty of the executive organ to report annually to the shareholders and 
establish the corporate accounts. In addition, auditors establish a special report in which 
corporate accounts and other sensitive information are certified. These duties are common to 
all companies, whether private or public. 
 
Concerning public companies whose shares are negotiated on a regulated market registered in 
the EU, a set of European legal acts48 adds an additional layer of financial information. The 
United States also has such legal requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 200249 and 
under S.E.C. Rules. 
Firstly, information about the financial operation is due when a company asks for initial public 
offering and also seasoned public offering. The company will release a legal note including 
general overview of the company, accounting information and a description of the operation 
along with a resume. 
Secondly, a public company must periodically release a report after each financial semester. 
Such a report, even if it shares some common features with the more classic annual report 
released by private companies, is often far more dense than the latter, as it contains more 
                                                          
46 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, Action Plan: European company law and 
corporate governance - a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, 
(COM/2012/0740 final), 2012, 1. Introduction. 
47 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 the exercise of certain 
rights of shareholders in listed companies (as amended by the directive 2017/828/EU of 17 May 2017 as regards 
the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement), (OJEU 20/05/2017 L 132/1), (hereinafter, 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive). 
48 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for 
market abuse (market abuse directive), (OJEU 16/04/2014 L 173/179), Directive 2017/1129 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 June on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the 
public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, (OJEU 30/06/2017, L 168/12), Directive 2014/65/EU of 15 
May 2014 on markets in financial instrument, (OJEU 12/06/2014 L 173/349), Directive 2004/109/EC of 15 
December 2004 on the harmonization of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose 
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, (OJEU 31/12/2004, L 390/38). 
49 United States of America, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745). 
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information related to the financial and non-financial affairs of the public company. It includes, 
for instance, all the corporate social responsibility information. 
Lastly, a public company is obliged to immediately share to the public information that could 
impact the share price of the company, such as the withdrawal of an executive officer or an 
agreement with a major partner. Breach of such a duty can have major consequences as such 
undisclosed information is qualified as insider information, which use on the market or simply 
transmission to a third-party is strictly forbidden and severely punished50. 
This kind of duty is criticized as excessively costly for the companies. A special division must 
often be settled in such companies, labeled “Financial communication” with several employees 
affected to it. Moreover, it is often time consuming for the executive managers and directors51. 
 
Could Blockchain help reduce the costs in terms of money and time of such information duties? 
The answer seems to be positive as the blockchain primarily works as a database register. It is 
no surprise then that the Delaware State now offers a Corporate Register built on that 
technology52. Blockchain can offer an alternative to the more ancient public registers and the 
most recent internet servers by offering a way to access immediately and cost-free as such 
information and to allow companies to provide this data under a rapid and automatized process. 
As long as complex information can be shared through the peer-to-peer system, as it is the 
case53, the nature of this information is irrelevant. It is therefore possible to share documents 
written in prose54 or numbers set into accounts55, as it is already the case for the more classical 
Company Register. The quantity of information is also irrelevant once a system has been 
established. Private companies will have less information to transfer to the system, on the 
contrary of public companies which should also be more reactive to comply with the 
transmission of relevant information. 
 
The advantages of such a system are clear. The information can be stored indefinitively and be 
time-stamped. Such information will be valuable in many fields only to verify that a company 
has correctly complied with its duty of information. In the case of insolvency law, such 
                                                          
50 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for 
market abuse (market abuse directive), (OJEU 16/04/2014 L 173/179), Art. 3(2). 
51 Engel E., Hayes R. M., Wang X.: The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and firms’ going-private decisions, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 44 (1–2), 2007, [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.07.002], p. 116-145. 
52 [http://fortune.com/2017/08/01/blockchain-shareholders-law], accessed on 28/08/2018. 
53 V. Supra 1. 
54 Such as the name of the company, the address of its registered office, the charts of association, activities reports 
to shareholders and so on. 
55 All the corporate accounts. 
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information is vital as it has a detrimental effect on the validity of some contracts and the rights 
to the creditors. For instance, in some countries, once an insolvency procedure is open, some 
contracts can be rendered void if they were concluded during a certain time gap before.. It is 
the case especially for guarantee contracts. It is the same for the enforcement of contracts in 
France where creditors cannot ask anymore individually the enforcement of agreements. In that 
case, the time-stamp offers a perfect proof to settle disputes. We can also imagine, outside of 
corporate law, that if contracts are concluded in the form of a smart contract, the opening of an 
insolvency procedure will automatically void the smart contract or block its effects (in case of 
enforcement paralysis) without the need to ask that to a court. 
 
What could be the architecture of such a system? Regarding public information, the system can 
be as basic as the bitcoin one. The data will be collected inside the system and made 
immediately public. Anyone logging on the system can access the information. The system will 
work based on mining by the companies themselves who will have to put some computing 
power in order to mine, mining allowing the right to send information to the blockchain. It is 
also possible, based on a token system, to allow auditors to access some private documentation 
in order for them to certify some data. The Blockchain could then offer File-Sharing services 
with restricted access to sensitive information56. In order to certify accounts, auditors need to 
verify how evaluations were made and if the statements are accurate, faithful and provide a true 
and fair view of the company financial situation. The use of token will assure the confidentiality 
of such private documentation and the blockchain will then act as a virtual data room. 
 
Such a system can be either public with no intermediaries or private. In a public system, no 
authority will check the quality of information sent to the system. Oversight would remain 
outside the blockchain where a judge or court clerk will continue to play that role. Some other 
drawbacks exist as it will be difficult to change or delete any information on that database, even 
if needed. Moreover, no control ex ante will be made as it is the case today in many systems57. 
In a private system, one intermediary will have the duty to verify ex-ante and be able to delete 
sensible information and correct mistakes58. 
 
                                                          
56 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 119. 
57 Usually, Court clerks verify the data sent before publishing it to the central register. 
58 See infra for more detailed drawbacks. 
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2.1.2. Shareholding structure related information 
 
Information is the key for a shareholder to use wisely and efficiently his shareholder’s rights. It 
is necessary for him to receive information about the date of the annual general meeting, the 
place where it will be held, the proposed resolution and all the relevant information (such as a 
resume of a proposed new executive manager or member of the board). This information is not 
made public before and therefore, does not belong to the former studied kind of information 
(even if, at the end, the record of the vote is made public). 
To effectively receive this information, a shareholder must provide a way for the company to 
send it to him. Also, knowing the nature of its shareholder can help a company both to improve 
its corporate governance and to dialog more effectively with the blockholders and other influent 
shareholders59. 
 
Nevertheless, the information that a company has over a shareholder is limited. It raises two 
intermingled questions. First, who is the effective shareholder in regard to corporate law; 
second, how to identify the effective shareholder? 
 
The first question is vital as the effective exercise of the shareholders’ rights only belongs to 
the person recognized by the local corporate law as shareholders. In small companies, such an 
issue does not exist: either the name and address of the shareholder is written in the article of 
associations (such as it is the case, in France, for the S.A.R.L.), either the title of the company 
is registered to a shareholder’s account providing the name and address of that shareholder and 
managed by the company itself. Access and knowledge of this identity are obvious. 
 
Usually, when the company becomes public, a more complex structure arises. Channels of 
intermediaries can be settled, where an intermediary will buy for the account of someone shares 
of the company. The latter can also be an intermediary who asked that on behalf of the final 
client who can also live outside the country where the company is registered. The titles are no 
longer nominal shares but bearers share, where the identity of the bearer can remain hidden. 
Also, in some systems, like the U.S., bank can buy large number of stocks and issue depositary 
                                                          
59 On that subject: Becht M, Franks J., Mayer C., Rossi S.: Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a 
Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, Review of Financial Studies, 22(8), 2009, p. 3093-3129. 
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receipts. They will be the main interlocutor with the issuer of the stock and receive the 
shareholders’ information that they will transmit to the owners of the depositary receipts60. 
 
Is such a system, a company needs to know who their shareholders effectively are. Several 
systems in the European Union instituted a procedure of shareholders’ identification that could 
either rely on the intermediaries themselves or a central securities depositary (CSD). Usually, 
such a system must be settled by the law of the company. A company must then ask to all the 
intermediaries to transmit the information of their client in a bottom-up fashion. When the 
option exists, it can ask the CSD to provide a complete cartography of its shareholding structure. 
Such a procedure is time-consuming and the company itself supports the costs. The So-called 
directive about Shareholders right harmonize the procedure of identification which will mainly 
be based on duties imposed on intermediaries. When a chain of intermediaries exists, those will 
have a duty to transmit the request to the known intermediaries without delay and responses 
must be transmitted directly to the company itself61. 
 
Moreover, corporate law can also favor first layer owner of the share rather than the last layer. 
For instance, if an intermediary subscribed a share, on account of another intermediary on 
behalf of an investor, who will have the right to effectively cast the vote? Some systems, as 
France, favor the first layer as the owner of the share account is deemed to be the shareholder. 
Therefore, if such an intermediary casts a vote that does not comply with the instructions of its 
client, such a vote will be valid. Some countries, especially in Common Law systems, 
specifically make the choice to the final economic owner of the share that is the investor. 
So, to summarize, there are two issues of corporate governance addressed here: information 
about shareholders and the effective use of shareholders’ rights. 
 
A blockchain system can solve both these issues. Such a system will be based on the identity 
of shareholders or intermediary and their inscription through a login. They can act either openly 
or pseudonymously in case of bearer shares62. In such a system, instead of shares being 
registered in a physical account held by the issuer or its intermediary, they will be created 
directly in the blockchain and then traded as any cryptocurrency. The main question is, 
                                                          
60 Bonneau T., Drummond F., Droit des marchés financiers, Economica Paris, 2010, p. 158. 
61 Shareholders’ Rights Directive, Art. 3(a). 
62 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 38-39. 
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however, the nature of such a share. Before the blockchain, shares could be traded on paper 
titles, the bearer of the paper being seen as the rightful owner of the share. They could also be 
held into the shareholder’s account, which is the main system today in Europe. A central book 
is held by the issuer, and each issuance create a given number of shares. For each shareholder, 
there will be a specific account created to register the number of shares he owns. Each one of 
those is the owner of an account with the number of shares he has purchased. For instance, if 
1000 shares are issued, the issuer will mark this issuance in its book. It will then divide the 1000 
shares between two subscribers: A would receive 400 shares and B 600 shares. Each investor 
will be the owner of its own account. In account A there will be 400 shares registered and in 
account B, 600. If B sells 100 shares to A, then B will ask the issuer to transfer 100 of his shares 
into account A. The book administrated by the issuer is a way to recognize and enforce 
ownership upon the shares. This is the simplest stage, as the issuer can delegate the management 
of the accounts to a professional and a central securities depositary can centralize all the 
accounts of a large number of issuers. 
 
The blockchain can be used in two ways. It can mirror the legal system of the shareholding with 
no binding effects. It would be necessary to translate the existing accounts into the blockchain 
to permit the flow of information. In such a system, if a shareholder sells his share, he must still 
give an order to the issuer or transmit the paper to the buyer. Then, someone has to register the 
transaction into the blockchain. Such a system is inefficient and there could be no 
synchronization at all between the real state of the capital and the one registered in a blockchain. 
In is also possible to legally recognize a share registered on blockchain. In such a system, the 
issuance of shares would happen on the blockchain itself as well as the trading of the blockchain 
of shares. Such a system is more efficient hence some countries have adopted it, especially 
France, which allows the registering of shares either in a traditional account or on a 
blockchain63. 
 
Anyway, any user of the system would have to identify either as the issuer (which will be unique 
for each share it issues), intermediary or investor. Each of these entities or people will be linked 
to a specific login effectively replacing the current share registers. Therefore, when an investor 
invests in a company through several intermediaries (the investor may not even know that a 
                                                          
63 France, Ordonnance n° 2017-1674 du 8 décembre 2017 relative à l'utilisation d'un dispositif d'enregistrement 
électronique partagé pour la représentation et la transmission de titres financiers, (JORF n°0287 du 9 décembre 
2017, texte n° 24), art. 1 and curent art. L. 228-1 of the French Commercial Code. 
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chain has been created), the system is able to share this information immediately to the issuer. 
There will be no need anymore to ask each intermediary the identity of the client on behalf of 
whom they act. Information could then be sent on a real time and cost free. Moreover, 
depending on the rule of the country in which the issuer is registered, the blockchain system 
could tag any link of that chain of intermediaries as the effective shareholder, allowing him to 
receive a token to exercise its voting rights. Intermediary links of the chain are usually not 
affected, as the logic is either to give such rights to the first layer or the last one. According to 
the lex fori, the system would automatically sent voting rights as token and relevant information 
to the effective shareholder. 
 
 
2.2. Vote and shareholders’ involvement 
In this part, we discus how the use of BC technology by companies and for corporate 
governance may impact the vote itself (2.2.1), and behavior from activists (2.2.2). 
2.2.1. Direct vote  
 
Voting. Current limits to voting rights, largely fought by policy makers -be at the international, 
European or national levels-, and by investors are well known, and also regularly discussed 
among scholars. They are mainly obstacles of the concrete exercise of voting rights and 
comprise among others inexact voter lists, incomplete distribution of ballots, and even chaotic 
vote of tabulation.64 With the view to eliminate or at least alleviate these impediments to the 
correct exercise of voting, a few stock exchanges have experienced platforms for voting via 
blockchain technology.65 Concretely, shareholders receive tokens, or so-called ‘votecoins’, that 
they can in return send to addresses on the BC in order to register their votes directly.66 
According to authors promoting the use of BC for votes, the expected benefits are significant: 
among others, accuracy of BC voting and greater transparency67 would constitute a motivation 
for shareholders to participate more directly at the AGM. Hence, if used as a platform for voting, 
not only the BC would have effects on very practical issues in the exercise of the vote but would 
                                                          
64 Kahan, M.; Rock, E.: The hanging chads of corporate voting, Georgetown law Journal, 2008, 96, p.1227; 
Germain M. et alii, see ref. note 31 ; Magnier V. see ref. note 21. 
65 In feb. 2016, the NASDAQ Talinn (Estonia) SE as a significant example. 
66 Yermack, D. : ‘Corporate governance and Blockchain’, 2016, Working Paper No. w21802 NBER 16. 
67 Wright, A.; De Filippi, P.: Decentralized Blockchain technology and the rise of Lex Cryptographia, 2015, 
unpublished paper, [ssrn.com/abstract=2580664] 
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also significantly impact shareholders behavior. Consequently, it would permit a more direct 
shareholder democracy. Corporate governance issues, described in the Introduction part of this 
paper, would definitely benefit from the BC technology. 
 
We fully agree that the exercise of the voting rights can benefit from the use of BC technology. 
First of all, the company would have a better knowledge of its shareholding, and this 
information would be available on real time. The list of voters should then gain in accuracy. 
The so-called ‘record-date’ mechanism, currently associated with the delays to register 
exchanges on a stock exchange, would be largely solved, letting this procedure aside and out 
of date.68  
 
Empty voting. A more crucial issue referred to as ‘empty voting’ consists in holding shares in a 
company while simultaneously selling them short. Consequently, an investor may use borrowed 
shares to temporarily cast a vote in a company without suffering from the economic exposure 
to the financial risks in the price of its stock. Separating the voting rights from the economic 
interest in the company represents a real threat to the basis of shareholder franchise.69 Many 
policy makers including the European institutions have so far failed to regulate this technique. 
Using BC technology for share registration could limit this technique as it should provide more 
transparency and ‘early warning of the rearrangement of voting rights prior to the AGM.’70  
 
Other obstacles related to ‘cross-border’ vote71 could be partly solved with the use of BC 
platforms for vote. Delegation to vote is a major issue. Economic surveys have shown that many 
elections in US companies ended up being decided in favor if management ‘in a 
disproportionate’ number of cases.72 Pressure or even manipulation on a dispersed and little 
involved ownership could be the cause. In European countries like France the same lack of 
                                                          
68 Stock trades in US and several EU member states require 1 to 3 business days for settlement to occur and 
ownership to be transferred from seller to buyer. In the meantime, funds are exchanged between intermediaries 
and their clients, and shares are transferred on the books of the brokerage and the ledger of the company, under 
the supervision of the Clearing Central Depositary. Today, each settlement requires time and need numerous 
intermediaries. As rules fix the list of voters some (generally 3) days before the AGM is held, new shareholders 
are not registered for voting. Conversely, with a BC technology real-time information would permit to welcome 
new comers at the AGM. 
69 Hu, H.; Black, B.:  The new vote buying: Empty voting and hidden (morphable) ownership, Southern California 
Law Review, 2006, 79, p. 811. Adde Magnier V.: see ref. note 21, p. 123. 
70 Yermack D.; Corporate Governance and Blockchains, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2700475 
71 For a thoughtful analysis of EU cross-border voting issues, see Noland, M. et alii: The political economy of 
cross-border voting in Europe, Columbia Journal of European law, 2009, 16, p.1. 
72 Listokin, Y.: Management always wins the close ones, American law and Economics Review, 2008, 10, p. 159. 
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engagement from several shareholders prevails, leading to the so-called ‘blank check’ practice: 
it is a default rule that permits shareholders to be represented at the AGM by the President of 
the meeting, but preventing them to give specific instructions in this case. This practice 
automatically and erroneously tends to favor management policies.73 The 2007/36 shareholder 
directive has failed to limit this practice. We suggest that any incentive to vote directly, 
including through a BC process, would hopefully favor direct voting and consequently diminish 
the influence from management on votes at the AGM. 
 
The EU institutions particularly have to deal with the limited engagement of shareholders. 
Ironically, an additional issue related to delegation of votes came up as a side effect of the 
2007/36 Shareholders’ directive attempt to overcome the traditional rules set by Member States 
to limit delegations to vote. While the directive  facilitated the exercise of voting rights opening 
this representation power to ‘anyone’ other the spouse or another shareholder, it gave way to 
representation by professional third-parties, the so-called ‘proxy advisors’. Potential conflict of 
interests issues emerge when shareholders appealed to proxy advisors. It is worth confronting 
these issues with the BC use.  
 
Proxy advisors. Proxy advisers are legal persons that analyses, on a professional and 
commercial basis, the corporate disclosure and, where relevant, other information of listed 
companies with a view to informing investors’ voting decisions by providing research, advice 
or voting recommendations that relate to the exercise of voting rights74. They are key to the role 
of investment firms that own a large portfolio of shares and are unable to monitor all the vote 
proposed at the AGM. The main purpose of a proxy advisors is to analyze the resolution and 
give a recommendation to the voters. Often, the analysis is based on respect of corporate 
governance principles. They have major influence on certain votes such as remuneration of 
directors75 and they help shareholders to effectively exercise their voting right and avoid blank 
check practices. By registering their recommendation on a blockchain, proxy advisors could 
help shareholders to obtain in a quick and efficient way these recommendation and even to 
decide to follow them automatically. Moreover, as proxy advisors organize voting platforms 
for their clients, such voting platform could be established on a blockchain that could, in return, 
                                                          
73 Magnier V.: see ref. note 21. 
74 Shareholders’ Rights Directive, Art. 2(g). 
75 ESMA 2012/212, Discussion Paper, 22 March 2012. 
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be linked to the blockchain where the shares of the company are registered76. It can also help 
for proxy solicitation in the country where it is useful, that is when it is easy to establish proxy 
voting77. 
 
But such system is not neutral, as the proxy advisors can be subject to some conflict of interests 
as their profession is not neutral. For instance, they can both advise the company for 
establishing voting resolution and issue a recommendation. As blockchain facilitates the 
dissemination of the recommendation and the box ticking to fully vote following such 
recommendation, it can improve the detrimental effect of such conflicts78. Moreover, BC can 
facilitate a proxy battle as the voting token could be easily transferred to such proxy advisors. 
As the issues linked to proxy fights are common knowledge, BC works similarly as a catalyst 
to them. 
 
How assess the real impact of BC technology use for votes, so far? BC should definitely help 
moving towards a more direct democracy. At least, it could allow it. It remains to be seen if BC 
technology alone may restore and maintain confidence, one major corporate governance 
obstacle.79 We argue that this may happen only provided that company law and corporate 
governance improve to make sure trust and confidence be maintained: 
 
First, BC will not, on its own, stop mechanisms like last-minute lobbying or ‘behind the scene’ 
discussions80 whose impact exceeds functional procedures. Corporate law and governance 
recommendations are still needed to restore the ‘equal treatment of shareholders’.81 Not all 
shareholders are involved in negotiations partially led between managers and some investors, 
prior or outside the AGM. Shareholders suffer from this arrangements as for company law 
principal of equality among shareholders.82 Conversely, BC use for votes does not preclude 
lack of engagement from small or minority shareholders when voting is at cost. In this respect, 
                                                          
76 As for instance Broadbridge, a U.S. proxy advisor company: [https://www.globalcustodian.com/thought-
leadership/future-proxy-voting/], accessed on 28/08/2018. 
77 Such is the case in the U.S. where the proxy solicitation is oversight by the S.E.C. In France, it is much harder 
as it is limited to another shareholder, the spouse or the partner of a civil union when the company is private. Full 
liberty only exists in public companies: see art. L. 225-106 French Commercial Code. 
78 The European Union has for regulated the proxy advisors through transparency: Shareholders’ Rights Directive, 
Art. 3(j). 
79 See supra, introduction 
80 ‘Behind the scene’ see ref, Magnier, p. 131. 
81 OECD Principles, see ref., note 28. 
82 Magnier, V., supra note, p. 132. 
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BC may be qualified ‘neutral’.83 One major goal of the revised Shareholder directive in 2017 is 
to reinforce shareholders’ engagement. A fair engagement still need to be encouraged by good 
governance practice like longer term perspectives and less selfish behavior from some 
investors. These obstacles to good governance practice are more qualitative than simply 
procedural. Finally, if BC technology could benefit to shareholder and help develop more 
democratic behaviors inside companies that have to BC platforms for voting, in a way that being 
addressed tokens directly on a BC allow votes to be quickly and securely recorded, it does not 
avoid a major risk, allowed by BC also, i.e the lack of anonymity.84 
 
2.2.2. Activism-related issues  
 
If too little engagement from many shareholders is a corporate governance concern, activism 
from some others raises particular corporate governance issues. More specific to US/UK 
markets, activism is increasing in Europe due to active blockholders investing in European 
companies.85 Powerful professional shareholders, activists put pressure on boards to comply 
with their own strategy, mainly a short-termist-maximization-of-profit strategy that may be 
detrimental to longer-term expectations of the company itself. Despite the broadening 
consensus that engaging proactively in a company is vitally important, informal activism lowers 
the level playing field between shareholders. Among authors who predict greater transparency 
and improved liquidity on BC, one assumes that the market could identify activists more easily, 
with a sort of chilling effect on activism, due to a more costly activism.86 This assertion is based 
on economic models showing that blockholders’ trades are highly profitable during the period 
before they are required to disclose their ownership positions, but less once these positions are 
disclosed.87 This prediction favors the use of BC in company law. But, because these models 
are highly controversial, others coming up to the opposite conclusion, suggesting transparency 
helps major shareholders by improving liquidity and lowering their costs,88 we cannot further 
discuss this uncertain impact of BC use on corporate law.  
 
                                                          
83 See supra, 1 
84 See infra, 4. 
85 Magnier V.: see ref. note 21, p.128. 
86 Yermack, D. : see ref. note 701. 
87 Kyle A.; Vila, J.-L, Noise trading and takeovers, RAND Journal of Economics,1991, 22, p. 54; Collin-Dufresne, 
P., Fos, V.: Insider trading, Stochastic liquidity and Equilibrium prices, Econometrica, 2016, 84, p. 1441; Collin-
Dufresne, P.; Fos, V.: Do prices reveal the presence of informed trading?, Journal of finance, 2015, 70, p. 1555; 
Reported by Yermack, D.: see ref. note 70. 
88 Ibid. 
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More convincing is the ‘Exit’ threat argument defended by other scholars,89 because it works 
both ways. Depending on its real impact on the costs of selling, BC may modify the beneficial 
and strategic use of vote by activist shareholders. In the ever debated dilemma between ‘voice’ 
or ‘exit’,90 it is argued that activists’ strategy changes according to the costs of selling: they 
choose to influence the company’ managers though negotiation and participation when the costs 
of selling are high. Conversely, the lower the cost of selling, the more used the ‘Exit’ tool. 
Assuming with authors91 that a BC technology would significantly lower the costs of selling, 
we could anticipate that a BC frequent use by companies would have a great impact on their 
strategies: the ‘Exit’ threat could be reinforced and influence managers’ strategic decisions so 
that they satisfy investors’ requests more rapidly. In the trade-off between short-term - private 
benefits - versus long-term decisions - non-value maximizing projects -, the former would 
prevail on the latter. 92 If the impact of BC could then be beneficial to major investors, it could 
possibly do so at the detriment of the company. Depending on how deal with the conflict of 
interests issue, BC use could bring new risks to companies.93 
 
3. IMPROVED MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
 
3.1. A more efficient management 
 
Business companies are complex organizations. They can be classified from the simple state of 
one representative with no board or oversight council to complex groups of multiple and large 
corporations. 
The organization of power inside the company is the key to achieve corporate governance. The 
stakes differ according to the repartition of power inside the company. Usually, there is 
arbitration between power to the executive officers and power among the shareholders. This 
balance uses both prerogatives given to the different stakeholders and the use of sanctions by 
which the shareholders can revoke an executive officer, revoke the board, or ask for 
compensation in a tort-based claim. 
                                                          
89 Ibid. 
90 La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. ; Law and Finance, Journal of Political 
Economy, December 1998, Vol.106(6), 1998, pp.1113-1155. 
91 Edmans, A.: Blockholder trading, market efficiency, and managerial myopia, Journal of finance, 64, p. 2481; 
Admati A.; Pfleiderer, P.: The Wall Street walk and shareholder activism: Exit as a form of voice, Review of 
financial studies, 22, p. 2455: reported by Yermack, D., see ref. note 70. 
92 Discuss here the potential impact of the Warren US project, the Accountable Capitalism Act. 
93 See infra, 4. 
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There are roughly three levels to organize a company: the legal rule, the articles of association 
and shareholder’s agreement. 
The stakes also differ according to the social form of the company and the nature of the legal 
system. In France for instance, the law provides for the balance of power in the famous “société 
anonyme”. On the opposite, the balance of powers is freely decided in the articles of association 
by the founders who choose to create a “société par actions simplifiée”94. The legal norm can 
be more or less restrictive or even completely silent. 
 
Where the law is silent, the articles of the association set the main organizational rules of the 
company. This is the second level of organization and the founders, later the shareholders 
themselves, can set rules regarding proxy power in the company, attributions to the organs and 
duty from the executive officers toward the shareholders. The articles of the association can 
also rely on lower norms such as bylaws adopted by the board, detailing some aspects of the 
rule. For instance, the articles can provide for the creation of a special committee and direct the 
board to establish its rules through the enactment of bylaws. 
Lastly, some shareholders can decide to enter a covenant and sign a shareholder’s agreement. 
Such agreements deal with the sale of shares in view to protect the consistency of shareholders’ 
covenant or the use of voting rights (with some limitations such as the prohibition of voting 
rights sales). Agreements can be translated into the articles of association so as to facilitate their 
enforcement. They become then a full part of these articles applicable to all shareholders. They 
can, on the contrary, remain outside the scope of the articles of association and then act as 
regular contracts. 
 
Blockchain can help with such organization on two levels: by setting a decentralized and 
autonomous organization based on a new blockchain system (3.1.1) or an existing one, such as 
etherneum or by the use of smart contracts (3.1.2.). 
 
3.1.1. Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) 
 
A DAO is a digital organization working on the base of a blockchain system. It can be built 
around its own system or instead use a pre-existing one. As authors stated, “Blockchains may 
serve as an interoperable layer for AI or algorithmic systems to interact and potentially even 
                                                          
94 The law however asks for the institution of several organs and minimal attribution, such as the representative of 
the legal entity and the existence of an annual general meeting. 
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coordinate themselves with other code-based systems through a set of smart contracts acting 
as a decentralized autonomous organization”95. The purpose of such a DAO is to settle an 
autonomous organization where external intervention is not required. The operations are based 
on the use of the BC register, the implementation of autonomous smart contracts and the use of 
tokens. It can be used to implement a simple lottery system or be built on a more complex 
architecture. Resources needed for the use of the blockchain system (such as ether) can be 
provided by the members of the organization. Such token can be used to access resources 
provided by the DAO, such as dividends, or to represent rights upon the DAO, such as voting 
rights. For instance, a company offers to create complex organization based on Ethereum and 
offers a transcription of the French Constitution as a demo for its application96. 
 
Once it is established, a company built around a DAO would need to function by authorization 
level. Each stakeholder must have a user login. Shareholders receive authorization to cast votes 
for AGM and the board members receive such an authorization for the matter relevant to their 
prerogatives. For instance, the distribution of dividends can be based on the net income in the 
database: shareholders cast a vote to decide whether to put it in a reserve account or to distribute 
them. If the latter is chosen, the DAO will automatically distribute dividends among the 
shareholders. Moreover, the use of a DAO could help render effective control upon 
remuneration instituted by the so-called shareholders’ rights directive97 and that also exists in 
France98. A company can or must make mandatory a previous agreement of the AGM prior to 
the payment of directors. Smart contracts can then retain that payment if the vote is negative. 
Related to remuneration, a DAO can also effectively manage the distribution and exercise of 
stock options. A director could receive his stock options when the financial results are obtained. 
When a golden parachute has been voted, distribution can be made upon revocation… As the 
code is public, it is also a better way for shareholders to manage more efficiently the global 
remuneration of directors and board members. 
 
                                                          
95 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 148. 
96 See for instance [klsn.io] 
97 Shareholders’ Rights Directive, Art. 9(a). 
98 France, Loi n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la 
modernisation de la vie économique, (JORF n°0287 du 10 décembre 2016, texte n° 2), art. 161. 
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The shareholders’ rights directive entitles the board to authorize some contracts between the 
company and related parties, as it is the case when a board member signs an agreement with 
the company itself. Such a procedure could be automatized99. 
More complex interactions can also be settled. Suppose that the election of a new board member 
is proposed to the AGM. If the candidate has a user login, a positive vote would have for effect 
to give him access to information stored on a blockchain and to receive a token for any vote 
inside the board. 
 
As we can see, a company can be organized through a DAO but it needs the correct coding to 
achieve automatization. If the basic activities can be so coded, some activities cannot and there 
will always be the need to rely on human input inside the system itself. Some parts of the 
organization cannot be coded also, especially when the power given to the shareholders or the 
directors is too general and too vague. Where there is a fiduciary duty100, it will be in fact 
impossible to translate such a duty into a DAO101. The breach of such a duty will need court 
recognition. Moreover, if damages are requested, it will require an appreciation of the court if 
no penal clause was instituted. Other fields are subject to such uncertainty. For instance, the 
directive on shareholders’ rights states that “Member States should ensure that material related 
party transactions are submitted to approval by the shareholders or by the administrative or 
supervisory body according to procedures that prevent the related party from taking advantage 
of its position and provide adequate protection for the interests of the company and of the 
shareholders who are not a related party, including minority shareholders.”102 Yet, the definition 
of a related party remains blur. If the related party is directly a shareholder or a director, there 
are a few issues as those are registered on the blockchain. A simple system of recording some 
contracts into the system could help to initiate a procedure. But if the related party is not 
registered or is a hidden agent of the formers, then there is no way to allow the blockchain to 
cover such an event. 
 
                                                          
99 Shareholders’ Rights Directive, Art. 9(c). 
100 As it is the case in France, see Germain M., Magnier V., Les sociétés commerciales, L.G.D.J. Paris, 2017, n° 
1671. 
101 It would be the same in the very frequent non-disclosure agreement, where the breach is impossible to code 
correctly. 
102 Directive 2017/828/EU of 17 May 2017 as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement, 
(OJEU 20/05/2017, L 132/1), whereas 42. 
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Therefore, most of the time, the DAO will be a hybrid contractual organization103. The articles 
of association will then be settled on prose as a master agreement, while all the simple and 
technical clauses will be settled on the blockchain. The master agreement, for some clauses, 
will then rely on the block chain and for other on the prose, when they are more open-ended. 
Despite these limitations, the major decisions held by the AGM such as 
nominations/remuneration of directors, approving of financial statements and dividends can 
easily be coded. That offers the shareholders access to instantaneous use of their rights and 
protect them from fraud or dilatory actions from the executive board or representatives of the 
company. 
 
3.1.2. Smart contracts.  
 
When a shareholders’ agreement is not enacted on the articles of association, it remains a 
contract ranging from simple (“if you sell your shares, you must buy mine at the same price”) 
to very complex. But a contract written in prose can contain clauses far vaguer than contract 
translated in a program. The program can only function precisely if no human interaction is 
needed. The prose contract can contain definition clauses, a setting of goals but also general 
notions that can more easily embrace the totality of the hypothesis the contract tries to rule. On 
the opposite, smart contracts work solely on the basis of an “if… then…” rule. If conditions are 
vaguer and more human decision needed, then a human input is required, thus voiding the 
automatic aspect of smart contracts. However, it can prove impossible for some clauses to be 
translated, as vague terms or unknown conditions are prerequisites. It can prove useful for 
contractors to use general notions as “good faith” since several legal systems rely on this. Those 
broad notions help to cover the wide range of behaviors contractors could have or events they 
could face. Also, some goal can be set in a contract, usually at the beginning of it, to help to 
determine the correct behavior. Without these clauses, the future cannot be usefully managed 
and predicted. Yet, it is the main purpose of a contract. It simply means that some agreement 
will rely on human interaction, from the contractors themselves, an independent expert or a 
court decision. Therefore, some contracts will need to be hybrid contracts, as seen hereinbefore. 
                                                          
103 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 76. 
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Aside this obstacle and postponing for now the risk aspects104, such an organization of a 
shareholders’ agreement offers two main advantages105. 
 
First, the monitoring costs decrease even to 0, as a smart contract automatically reacts if it gets 
the right inputs. It proves very useful especially for the two main clauses existing, the voting 
clauses and the shares selling clauses. If a voting clause is set, then the smart contract will 
automatically adjust the voting token of the debtors to the one of the creditors. If the creditors 
use their token to vote positively, the smart contract will use the token of the debtors to vote 
alongside. Similarly, the selling of the shares of the debtor of the clause to a buyer will cause 
the automatic selling of the creditor (who could get an option as a phone notification for 
instance, to react instantaneously). Therefore, the parties to the agreement won’t need to oversee 
the contract but instead just let the smart contract work by itself. 
 
Second, the smart contract will diminish the opportunistic behavior of the parties. On the one 
hand, the use of vague clause that can lead to discussions in court, and therefore delay the 
enforcement of the agreement, will be nullified. The program will need to put precise 
mechanisms that do not allow human interpretation. On the other hand, the contract based on a 
blockchain is protected against the risk of fraud, as long as one of the parties cannot own more 
than 50% of the mining power of the blockchain. 
 
3.1.3. BC legal expert 
 
The use of BC to organize a company could foster the rise of a new kind of employee, officer 
or director (even on board), or even a whole new service inside the company to help organize a 
blockchain-structured company. Such a field of expertise will require skills embracing both the 
IT field and the legal field, in order to transpose correctly an organization into a blockchain. 
Given the key role such an actor could have, and keeping in mind the incorruptible aspect of 
the blockchain once it is established, her or his role will be sensible during the transposition 
phase, when a new set of rules must be translated into computing language. Contractor 
managers, given they acquire the needed skills in computing, could prove valuable. 
 
                                                          
104 See infra 4. 
105 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 80. 
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As such a service will have to manage sensible aspects to correctly translate legal or contractual 
terms in a smart contract and a DAO, some regulation would be needed. They will in fact act 
as internal controllers and other compliance officers, but not regarding activities of the firm 
rather its structure at its heart. The risk of capture by the management is high, especially if such 
an expert is an employee of the firm. Therefore, they would need to be neutral, have direct 
access to the core management but also be able to warn the shareholders in case of a major 
breach in the organization. They should at least benefit from the protection compliance officers 
have and, at the most, be totally independent, such as auditors are. The auditors could also 
embrace such an activity if the correct Chinese wall or incompatibilities are maintained, so that 
a unique auditors firm audits both accounting and the blockchain aspect. 
 
3.2. Related-party transactions issues? 
 
Related-party transactions is a major corporate law tool used to protect the company against 
conflicts of interests. Regulated in almost every jurisdiction it is based on a two-phase 
mechanism: a traditional ex-post enforcement and an interesting ex-ante declaration process. 
The latter applies by prevention to agreements between the company and its managers or 
referential shareholders. Information is given to the board by the ‘interested’ person (in situation 
of potential conflict of interests). The board, with the exception of this director, authorizes (or 
not) the agreement and, later, this authorization is approved (or rejected) by shareholders 
(except the ‘interested person’) at the AGM. Damaging override of the rejection may lead to 
sanctions to the interested person. The preventive disclosure rules place a burden upon 
management to self-report these transactions and compliance may be subject to 
misinterpretation and uncertainties, when it is not respected at all.  The revised Shareholders’ 
directive has attempted to deal with issues related to third-party transactions (à completer). But 
more improvement are needed. As preventing people from breaching the rules should prevail 
on sanction, BC may help improving the rules in two ways. First, greater transparency offered 
by BC technologies would permit to engage in real-time control against fraudulent agreements. 
Damages to the company could hence be more easily avoided. Second, one could imagine an 
automatization of standardized and sequential agreements. This automatized process currently 
exist through a smart contract. Smart contracts are small snippets of code that are directly 
deployed on the BC and meant to be executed in a decentralized manner in the BC network.106 
                                                          
106 For more details on smart contracts, see Szabo, N.: Smart contracts, 1994, unpublished paper 
[http://Szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html]. 
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As computer programs, they are neither smart (they still need a human intervention to be put it 
in place) nor real contracts (they only can represent copies of agreements or facts, or images 
etc…). Yet, these programs may help to emulate the correct execution of real agreements. If we 
follow Szabo, and De Filippi and Hassan107 - with no need here to discuss the feasibility of 
transposing every single legal rule and document into code -, smart contract ‘are able to 
automatically execute the terms of a specific agreement, providing trustless transactions via 
integrated enforcement mechanisms’, we suggest that such a tool be useful to automatize at 
least a great deal of (if not all) related-party agreements in groups of companies. Not only these 
agreements are frequent, but most of them are also standardized and sequential. In such a case, 
BC technology would hence help improving and securing the ex-ante phase of the rules related 
to these agreements, consequently improving management tools.   
 
3.3. Greater transparency of insider trading operations? 
 
Again, if BC technology offers greater transparency, it would be interesting to question the 
impact of its use on insider trading. Insider trading is illegal in US and Europe, criminal related 
sanctions being recently reinforced in the European Union via the 596/2014 Rule and other 
texts.108 Insider trading regulations constrain directors and managers from selling or buying 
shares of the company they manage benefiting from a significant information prior to make it 
public to the market. Greater transparency on (public) BC would permit boards or shareholders 
observe managers’ trades in real time, offering an accurate on-time control on these illegal 
behavior.109    
 
 
4. THE POTENTIAL ALTERATION OF SOME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS: 
EMERGENCE OF NEW GOVERNANCE RISKS 
 
The use of blockchain is not without risks. They can even void some security offered by the 
legal system itself, as they require renouncement of anonymity (which is sometimes the key). 
Three key features of a blockchain system can create new governance risks. Firstly, the 
transparency on a blockchain can prove adverse to governance and some management’s 
                                                          
107 De Filippi, P. ; Hassan, S. : see ref. note 34. 
108 EU insider trading rule [online ref] 
109 Discuss the benefit from legal or illegal insider trading as a compensation tool  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3307521 
29 
 
decisions will lack the required confidentiality (4.1.). Second, the permanent structure of a 
blockchain can prove detrimental when a human intervention is needed, such as a court decision 
(4.2.). Moreover, errors in the blockchain can prove difficult to adjust, with the potential of 
global paralysis of the company (4.3). Finally, conflict of interest may remain or be worsened 
on a blockchain as it is code and algorithm based (4.4.). 
 
4.1. Lack of confidentiality under a BC regime 
 
A public blockchain is necessarily transparent. This feature is the key to the rise of a trustful 
system with no third-party. However, if transparency is required110, some privacy may be 
maintained as clearly stated in Nakamoto original white Paper: “The necessity to announce all 
transactions publicly precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking the 
flow of information in another place: by keeping public keys anonymous.”111 Nonetheless, it 
may prove hard to keep key information private in such a system, both in the detriment of the 
shareholders (4.1.1.) and the company itself (4.1.2.). 
 
4.1.1. ‘Open’ votes; distinguish the impact on private/public BC 
 
When the shares of a company are registered on a blockchain, each shareholder will have to 
register itself on that blockchain112. The use of anonymity is, however, limited to the general 
public. As the original white paper states, “The public can see that someone is sending an 
amount to someone else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone. This is 
similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, where the time and size of 
individual trades, the "tape", is made public, but without telling who the parties were.”113 
However, such a “pseudonymity”114 has its limits. To enforce the shareholders right, the 
shareholder must have its identity disclosed at one point of the system, at least to assume its 
ownership of the shares. The actual system of intermediaries would remain: if a shareholder 
can add many layers between him and the issuer, which usually protects anonymity, the 
                                                          
110 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 37. 
111 [https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf], accessed on 28/08/2018, esp. “10. Privacy”. 
112 See supra 2.1. 
113 Ibid. 
114 “There are no real-world identities required to participate in the Bitcoin protocol. Any user can create a 
pseudonymous key pair at any moment, any number of them”, in Narayanan A. e.a., Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies 
technology, Princeton University Press, 2016, De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 2018, p. 38, ad notam 10. 
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blockchain system can track him instantaneously by a simple bottom-up check. Same if the true 
shareholder tries to add its identity under several financial vehicles. If all of them are registered 
on a blockchain, such effort will be fruitless. Only if, at one point, the chain exits the blockchain 
system, such stratagem would work. To protect himself, the shareholder will have to use a 
hidden agent or a front man, at the risk of not being able to enforce his shareholder rights. An 
intermediary has the duty to comply with the orders of his client, contrary to a shadow agent 
working outside the legal system. 
 
Is that to say that the rise of shares registered blockchain will destroy anonymity? At some point 
yes and we can conclude at the end of anonymity of the bearer-shares. But that kind of issue is 
not so detrimental, as the legal system evolves in a way to hamper this transparency nonetheless. 
The recent amendment of the shareholder rights directive states the possibility for all public 
companies relying on this bearer shares to identify their shareholders115. All the bearer shares 
under such a system will become identifiable, unless the member state uses the option to protect 
the shareholders detaining less than 0.5% of the shares, in other words, the powerless ones 
inside a company. Blockchain will not protect shareholders from that identification and can also 
facilitate that process116. 
 
4.1.2. ‘Open’ access to transactions 
 
Usually, company directors cannot hold bearer shares rather nominal shares. Such a legal 
provision seeks to oversee insider trading. However, unlike in a traditional system where the 
public cannot clearly see management transaction, the public aspect of a blockchain allows it. 
Investors and other third parties to a company could receive real-time feeds on the activity of 
the top management, thus misinterpreting shares selling or buying. It could impact the share 
price dramatically and create unexpected volatility on capitalization, detrimental to the true 
company value. 
 
4.2. What if a need to appeal to a new third party occurs? 
 
It is sometimes deemed necessary for a third party to intervene in the affairs of the company, 
for instance between shareholders tied by a shareholding. When a shareholder agreement agree 
                                                          
115 See supra 2.1. 
116 See supra 2.1. 
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to the future selling of shares, as an option for one party or due to a certain event, price of the 
shares cannot always be based on objective data. It is particularly true when the company is 
private as there is no capitalization value. It is also true of some agreements in public company, 
when the selling implies transfer of control, as a premium must then by paid. Therefore, an 
expert must intervene. 
 
Moreover, it is sometime necessary for a judge to intervene in the functioning of a company 
when the company itself may face paralysis. It can be for very basic reason as an organ cannot 
work normally after certain events. For instance, if all the member of the board were to die in 
a plane crash, a new board would have to be named. Usually, board members are nominated by 
an AGE. But it is the board itself that must summon such an AGE, which is impossible if there 
are no more board members… In that case, France has a judiciary system where the court will 
name a special representative whose mission is to summon the board and take the decision to 
summon the AGE, such resolving the issue of paralysis. A wide array of case relies on such a 
human intervene. For instance, if a manager act in a way that harm the interest of the company 
and its shareholders, but that manager has control over the company, corporate rules cannot 
allow his revocation. It is then necessary for a judge to intervene and if the activity of that 
manager is harmful to the company, to demote him. 
 
Finally, many insolvency procedure work in a way where the court demote directors from their 
position to name a special agent acting as the proxy of the company. 
All this human intervention cannot be translated into code. Moreover, for some of them, the 
human intervention is taken as the consequences of a dispute between shareholders and 
managers, so the managers who owns the access to take certain decision can refuse such access 
which will later need prosecution. Until then, paralysis may remain or certain harmful actions 
can be taken. The only possibility would be to organize the whole judiciary and expertise system 
into a blockchain, which is utopic, unfeasible and undesirable. 
 
4.3. What if BC Errors occur, followed by inertia? 
 
Blockchain is a large decentralized ledger registering all information data made since the 
beginning. Data stored in a BC cannot be retroactively modified nor deleted. Immutable 
preservation and traceability of operations are therefore two major assets of a BC. However, no 
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technique is 100% reliable. Cryptocurrencies, Ethereum117 or Bitcoins, can be diverted thanks 
to a computer fault. The private key may be hacked even though this risk should not be 
overstated. 118 It is minimal when the company is a knowledgeable professional who will not 
leave his private key accessible on the web. Another risk could come up from a possible 
collusion of miners gathered in ‘pool’ who divert the information.119 This happened in countries 
where electricity is cheap (China) or easy cooling (Iceland), in order to pool the computing 
power of different computers.120  
 
On a public BC, the state of the BC can only be updated through consensus so that is 
unfalsifiable (consensus technique). It is almost impossible to change the contents of a BC121 
because more than 51% of the computing power of all computers participating in the mining 
are needed to do so. However, a real governance problem in public BC exists because no 
authority is designed to resolve the difficulties or any key revocation system. This situation 
raises the issues of liability. Who would then be liable when data are modified or fake 
information is spread through a BC ledger? The developer who set up the BC - with a protocol 
of operation - and raised funds to pay minors in cryptocurrencies? Or the start-up of BC, the 
chaintech, who is an intermediary to the company that uses a BC platform, in particular to 
register its bylaws, AGM or financial reports, and contractual agreements? Because of the 
decentralized organization of the BC, neither the developers nor the chaintech can have control 
on a public BC. Only the community of miners, developers and users have the power to modify 
the initial protocol on a decentralized organization with no centralized control.   
 
The risk of hacking is even greater in a private BC managed by an administrator, because a 
hacker can infiltrate the network of this administrator. In addition, in a private BC, the network 
administrator can modify the operating rules of the BC as well as the content of the BC. The 
value of the evidence in a private BC cannot be the same as in a public BC.  
 
                                                          
117 A failure in the code of a smart contract has been exploited on Ethereum BC. Consequently, the consensus was 
to split the BC (‘fork) and initial funders were reimbursed.   
118 On Bitcoin or Ethereum BC, non-professionnals had left their assets on public addresses and the platform held 
the private key.   
119 To avoid risks of collusion, other mechanisms have been studied like the proof-of-work scheme. It requires that 
a potential thief or forger have to alter not only the transaction record they wish to divert, but also all subsequent 
blocks up to the current one. According to this scheme, altering historical data in a BC prohibitively costly.  
120 D.Legeais, Juris-classeur Com. Fasc. 534.  
121 Since the hash of the block header is included as an element in the header of the next block, the hash of the next 
block header will also change, as will the subsequent block headers.  
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Failures in the BC technology already happened. These failures may undermine confidence in 
this new technology. These technological issues should be fixed prior to be used at large scale 
by companies. 
 
4.4. Potential conflict of interest issues 
 
Conflicts of interests are a major issue in corporate law and governance. Jensen and Meckling, 
who defended the agency theory, conflicts of interests between managers, as agents, and 
shareholders, as principals, occur when the former act in their own self- interests, by extracting 
benefits from the company, all at the detriment of the shareholders’ and the company’s interests. 
Such opportunistic behavior results in agency costs, including losses in corporate value, 
permitted by informational asymmetries at the benefit of managers. The key governance 
solution to avoid discretionary opportunistic behaviors and make managers behave fairly is 
brought through greater transparency. Such mechanisms as ‘say on pay’122 or ‘related-party 
transactions’123 are part of the solution. As shown above, these mechanism are easy to code as 
long as their substantial clauses remain quantitative (amount of remuneration or deal). When 
the clause need be more qualitative, like codifying a ‘good faith’ situation, code seems of no 
real help. On BC, greater transparency should therefor prevail, 124 helping limiting conflict of 
interests. But this is mainly true for forms of ‘quantitative’ situation. As for more ‘qualitative’ 
ones, classical human resources and controls should still be relevant. If not clearly identified, 
and solve, these differences may impair the companies’ activities, trust on the markets and 
altogether the use of BC as a benefit for corporate governance. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Our finding is that considering that the main issues with the use of a Blockchain is its transparent 
and permanent setting, this kind of features comply hardly with the needs of business activity 
and companies. Therefore, before setting a blockchain, one must remain conscious of the way 
he wants to settle it. It can either be public or private. When a register is established on 
blockchain, the use of a third-party can prove vital. 
 
                                                          
122 See supra. 
123 See supra. 
124 See supra. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3307521 
34 
 
The governance of such a record will either been made through a central authority or will rely 
on public transparency and no third-party. A purely decentralized record would cost obviously 
less as there will be no intermediation cost for the authority overseeing the blockchain. 
However, such a system could be sensible to fraud and overtaking. If someone manage to obtain 
more than 50% of the miners computing power, it will be able to alter the blockchain and render 
void the authenticity of the data stored in it125. He would be able to add false information or 
delete previous information. Trust in the register would then be nullified. Moreover, in such a 
system, there would be no quality control other than the public. It is unsure that vigilant public 
overwatch regarding all the companies will work. The amount of work would be enormous 
when the gains are weak. Moreover, if false information is stored, it is extremely difficult to 
correct it on a public blockchain. On the contrary, a private blockchain relies on a central 
authority which oversees the faithfulness of the data and correct the database if an error 
occurred126. 
 
More importantly, a public blockchain will not permit any right to oblivion for former executive 
officers whose name is bound to the insolvency of their former company. Such right to oblivion 
can exist in some exceptional cases127. Such issues can be addressed with a third-party but can 
hampers the key features of a blockchain. Arbitrages must be made by legislator. 
 
Finally, no doubt BC technology is not neutral for corporate law. Corporate governance could 
change in some ways under a BC regime and the balance of power may significantly be upended 
among actors, i.e. small/large shareholders and managers. Corporate governance may also 
benefit from it on democratic grounds. However, legal and financial risks may occur for the 
company and its shareholders. These opportunities and risks should be taken care of. Policy 
makers should be aware of both of them and bring adapted answers to the issues related to the 
new technology.  
 
Considering the limits of the article, here are additional thoughts for further potential 
discussion. Mainly three questions need to be raised and solved: (1) What type of reform: 
                                                          
125 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 113 
126 De Filippi P., Wright A., Blockchain and the Law: The Rule of Code, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, 2018, p. 114. 
127 EUJC,  9 march 2017, aff. C-398/15, Camera di Commercio c/ Salvatore Manni. 
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max/minimum changes?; (2) Which level? In Europe: Member states reform or EU Directive?  
(3) Governance OF BC themselves (see introduction). 
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